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A B S T R A C T
This article examines the smuggling of coltan into and out of artisanal mining
areas in northern Katanga where the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi), a
policy on conﬂict minerals, tries to improve transparency in trading tin,
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tantalum (coltan) and tungsten. The article approaches smuggling from a soci-
ology of economic life perspective, closely examining how and why artisanal
miners and mine-based middlemen (négociants) helped smugglers (hiboux) in
the trafﬁcking of coltan. The ﬁndings indicate that the social networks in
which miners and mine-based négociants are embedded allow the miners,
négociants and smugglers to maintain close relationships and to breach ofﬁcial
regulations, but miners and mine-based négociants also rely on the same net-
works to cheat in their dealings with the smugglers. This article concludes
that, rather than considering coltan mining areas to be ‘enclaves of regula-
tions’, understanding and addressing smuggling at both local and broader con-
texts call for a comprehensive, more contextualised approach.
 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Nowadays, because of the International Tin Research Institute’s (ITRI) Tin
Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi) regulations in trading minerals, smuggling
coltan in and out of artisanal mining areas is, like witchcraft or malevolent
practices of sorcery, done secretly. One cannot engage in smuggling activ-
ities with unknown persons. (Hiboux  Int.)
In (post-)crisis situations and generally within societies where external
policy – like the iTSCi – is enforced, people display different responses
to such a policy (Mosse ; Colebatch ). In this respect, this
article is primarily concerned with the smuggling of coltan, but also
refers to related deceptive practices. Although smuggling goods – espe-
cially minerals – has characterised the informal economic sector in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and neighbouring countries,
for decades (MacGaffey ; Garrett & Mitchell ), this study revi-
sits this phenomenon, viewing smuggling as an important primary
response that circumvents the iTSCi policy that has been in place in nor-
thern Katanga since .
Designed in  by ITRI, a private initiative that represents the tin
industry and its members who are mainly mining and smelting compan-
ies, iTSCi aims to improve the ‘public image’ (Vogel & Radley :
) of ITRI’s members sourcing minerals in conﬂict-affected areas
like the eastern DRC. It provides a means of determining the origin of
tin, tantalum and tungsten (referred to as  T) and documenting the
trade chain of these minerals by ‘tagging and bagging’ their loads at
the mining sites, trading posts and mineral depots. Although it is a
private initiative, iTSCi is in line with ofﬁcial international and national
mining policies (see Section ).
Revisiting the long-standing practice of smuggling is useful for under-
standing the full impact of international policies addressing conﬂict
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minerals. This article provides an in-depth and contextualised analysis of
how policies, especially iTSCi, are put in force and challenged in the
eastern Congo. According to the International Peace Information
Service (IPIS : ), the term ‘conﬂict minerals’ is applied to
deﬁne the extraction and trade of minerals from conﬂict-affected
areas where human rights abuses take place. Mineral exploitation, smug-
gling and conﬂict are seen as interwoven. It is often argued that artisanal
and small-scale mining, smuggling minerals and conﬂicts allow armed
groups operating in the eastern DRC to survive due to the proﬁts they
make from mining (Global Witness ).
This view has sparked a controversial debate among scientists and
other observers (Autesserre ). On the one hand, policy initiatives
addressing conﬂict minerals align with a large spectrum of reforms in
mining governance aimed at ﬁghting corruption and improving trans-
parency of the minerals’ ﬂow in the hope of reducing conﬂict and build-
ing a better functioning state (Garrett & Mitchell ). On the other
hand, several observers point out that ‘conﬂict-free’ initiatives like
iTSCi are top-down, externally driven, insufﬁciently in tune with one
another and lack an in-depth understanding of local dynamics
(Geenen ). While favouring a monopoly in trading minerals for
certain buyers (Diemel & Cuvelier ; Vogel & Radley ), these
initiatives are also confronted with overlapping governing authorities
on the ground (Müller-Koné ). Given that the issue of smuggling
minerals has received scant attention regarding conﬂict-free minerals’
initiatives, this article explores by whom such initiatives, especially
iTSCi, are challenged and in which manner people are actively ‘resist-
ing’ it.
The iTSCi Programme aligns with both the Congolese government
and international policy on conﬂict-free minerals in eastern DRC.
Since the early s, the international community has urged the
DRC government to reform the mineral sector, which was said to
encourage various types of ‘networks of conﬂict economies’ (Utas
: ), in which groups of (in)formal actors reap illegal beneﬁts
from mining that contribute directly and indirectly to conﬂict.
In northern Katanga, iTSCi aims to curb the smuggling of coltan.
Given that the coltan business has been controlled by ‘criminal actors’
(Global Witness ), iTSCi’s main objective is to improve the trans-
parency of this business (iTSCi ). In addition, coltan is a mineral
that has often been linked to discussions of conﬂict minerals in media
reports and advocacy campaigns conducted by non-governmental orga-
nisations (Nest : –). Making the coltan trade more transparent
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would ‘make an important contribution to the evolution of better gov-
ernance of the sector’ (Spittaels : ) and would help artisanal
miners and mine-based middlemen (so-called négociants) to carry out
their activities more safely and efﬁciently by preventing abuses by
armed groups (De Koning ). Why, then, have these miners and
négociants cooperated with coltan smugglers, undermining iTSCi’s
primary objective? How is smuggling actually organised and what are
the motives and discourses of the people involved?
In addressing these questions, this article draws on the sociology of
economic life perspective, which understands economic action to be
embedded in social networks (Granovetter ). Based on 
months of ﬁeldwork conducted mainly at three artisanal mining sites
in northern Katanga (Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-Baridi), the study
analyses how social networks in which mineworkers and négociants par-
ticipate facilitate smuggling and, crucially, how these networks are orga-
nised and adapt their strategies in response to iTSCi. Thus, the article
builds on the argument that people adapt their strategies of negotiating
policy outcomes while trying ‘to make policy ﬁt their own perspectives of
the problem and goals’ (Hilhorst : ).
This article is organised as follows. The next two sections discuss the
theoretical framework and elaborate on the methods of data collection
and analysis. We then brieﬂy introduce the local and historical context
of  Tmining and the coltan trade in northern Katanga. This is followed
by an outline of the signiﬁcance of coltan smuggling in the study areas.
The next section discusses the policy regarding smuggling and the
organisation of the coltan trade under iTSCi. This is followed by an
explanation of the modus operandi of miners and négociants in liaising
with and deceiving the smugglers. The ﬁnal section discusses the main
outcomes of this article.
 . T H E O R I S I N G I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y A N D S O C I A L N E T W O R K S
The sociology of economic life school builds on the assumption that eco-
nomic action is linked to or depends on actions and institutions that are
non-economic in content, goals and processes (Granovetter : ).
This theory is important for understanding how debates on the informal
economy, of which smuggling is an integral part, have evolved in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
The informal economy, consisting of ‘economic activities taking place
outside the framework of the state’ (Meagher : ) has been
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documented extensively in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa since the
end of the s (MacGaffey ; Reno ; Raeymaekers ).
Several studies on the informal economy have investigated the smug-
gling of minerals speciﬁcally (Deardorff & Stopler ; Hilson &
Potter ; Vocke & Oomes ). Scholars have shown that the
growth of an informal and ‘invisible economy’ (Meagher : )
allows people to respond to state failure in service provision.
In the s, social networks gained prominence in social science
research. Working with this concept enables the tracing of informal
organisational processes (Meagher : ), and it has since been
used to examine smuggling (Meagher ) and other forms of behav-
iour (including corruption) that violate the laws or regulations of the
state. Many authors have argued that, in the absence of efﬁcient eco-
nomic markets, kinship-based and trust-based relations between
people – especially sellers and buyers – and their networks play a key
role in economic life (Granovetter ; Hart ; Titeca & De
Herdt ).
Opinions differ on whether social networks are beneﬁcial in the
context of economic development. Some scholars have asserted that
people use social bonds or support networks to access resources and
to foster a ‘logic of self-protection’ (Vlassenroot et al. : ). Other
researchers have stressed that social networks are detrimental to eco-
nomic development, arguing that these networks foster social liabilities
and encourage predatory or criminal activities such as protection
rackets, drug trafﬁcking and smuggling (Bayart ; Reno ;
Roitman ).
Smuggling and cheating behaviours can be approached in multiple
ways in terms of how they are perceived by social actors. Olivier de
Sardan (), for example, has argued that these practices have vari-
able legitimacies. They can take place in a hidden or open manner
‘without anyone taking offence at them’ (Olivier de Sardan : ).
In their seminal study on cross-border trade and practical norms in
Uganda’s West Nile region, Titeca & De Herdt (: ), referred
to a kind of ‘moral economy of smuggling’ that is strongly legitimised
by the local populations in reaction to the abandonment of the region
by the central state. Kibreab (), in his study on cheating behaviours
among refugees in the Horn of Africa, found that refugees did not see
cheating as dishonest as long as it concerned aid institutions.
The above literature points to various types of networks, created in dif-
ferent contexts and for diverse ends, including for the purpose of smug-
gling. Although it does not explain how smuggling networks may adapt
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and change their strategies in response to external intervention (such as
iTSCi policy), there has been signiﬁcant interest in analysing how smug-
gling practices breach ‘formal regulations’, predominantly those of the
state or those set by ‘formal’ institutions such as aid agencies (Kibreab
). The present study explores the manner in which people
‘resisted’ iTSCi, showing how miners and négociants used social networks
both for breaching its ‘formal’ regulations and for cheating in their deal-
ings with ‘informal’ smugglers.
Using an approach grounded in the sociology of economic life to
investigate coltan smuggling is useful in two ways. First, it facilitates the
analysis of the details of why and how networks are structured around
speciﬁc social actors and which non-economic factors help these net-
works to emerge and persist. Second, it helps situate smuggling and
cheating practices around coltan in the local context, examining the
meaning of the policies and practices for the people involved.
Analytically, this article aligns with the concept of ‘networks of conﬂict
economies’, coined by Utas (). In many instances, Utas’s concept
can also be applied to post-conﬂict economies, such as the study areas
dealing with and recovering from conﬂict. After all, despite numerous
peace accords, the DRC experiences ongoing (armed) conﬂicts
(Vlassenroot et al. ). In his study on African conﬂicts and trans-
border networks, Utas argued that ‘networks of conﬂict economies’
are very wide, ranging from neighbourhoods and cities, to rural areas,
to the national and transnational level. They frequently, but not
always, operate clandestinely, if not illicitly (Utas : ). He
described trans-border networks as groups of actors connected for eco-
nomic, political or war agendas, and as complex, dispersed over geo-
graphic space, operating under the control of ‘big men’ and based on
‘social relations’ (Utas : ).
Although Utas mainly studied trans-border dynamics, his concept of
networks of conﬂict economies was useful for the present study. In add-
ition to looking at networks ‘from an actor-centred perspective’ (Utas
: ), his approach tallies with the sociology of economic life
approach, which focuses on analysing economic activities as cultural,
contextual and political phenomena rather than being purely based
on rational actors’ economic decisions (Granovetter ; Beckert
). Additionally, it is interesting to explore how networks around
coltan smuggling have adapted to iTSCi. This is important given that net-
works are not static or monolithic and can operate at different levels of
society (i.e. local, provincial, national, regional and international)
(Twijnstra et al. ; Diemel & Cuvelier ).
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Utas (: –) identiﬁed four factors to consider when studying
networks of conﬂict economies: (i) the degree of power that individual
‘big men’ invest and the resources they possess; (ii) the clandestine and
unstable character of networks, which can make them efﬁcient, ﬂexible
and adaptable to new functions; (iii) the fact that networks cut across
social and economic groups, as well as geographies; and (iv) that these
networks may also involve ‘criminal actors’.
By discussing these factors, this article contributes to the sociology of
economic life literature, demonstrating that miners, mine-based
négociants and smugglers adapted their smuggling strategies in response
to iTSCi. However, contrary to Utas’s argument, these networks were not
just under the control of ‘big men’ but also involved less powerful actors,
such as ordinary miners.
 . M E T H O D S
This article draws on qualitative ﬁeldwork undertaken from June 
to March  and continued in January . The ﬁeldwork followed
a multi-sited ethnographic approach (Marcus ) in northern
Katanga (at the three mining sites: the Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-
Baridi mines), in the city of Kalemie, and in South Kivu in the cities of
Uvira and Misisi. Data were collected through observing how minewor-
kers extracted, processed and sold coltan to négociants, and through
in-depth individual interviews, group interviews and informal conversa-
tions with miners, négociants and ‘clandestine négociants’ (smugglers)
of coltan (known as hiboux – literally, owls). In total, nearly  artisanal
miners and  négociants participated in this study.
Gathering reliable data on smuggling is difﬁcult, given the lack of
ofﬁcial statistics on this practice, corruption and the concealing of infor-
mation on it. Heemskerk (: ) has contended that, ‘because of
their lack of conﬁdence in the good intentions of the government and
researchers, miners may not reveal that they sell their product outside
legal channels, and violate other regulations’. For this reason, gaining
trust and collecting accurate empirical data among this population
required a multifaceted approach (Ellis & MacGaffey : ) and a
long-term period of ﬁeldwork in mining areas, urban locations and
areas where hiboux travelled.
Marcus (: –) has proposed that, when doing multi-sited eth-
nography, one should ‘follow people and things’. In line with this
approach, the ﬁrst author followed  hiboux in various locations,
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which was challenging. Smuggling is characterised by great secrecy.
Other challenges were related to the geographic space this study
covered and how nimbly these individuals operated across this space.
Additionally, as noted in related studies (Titeca & De Herdt :
), interviewing people such as hiboux regarding their activities can
put researchers in the position of dealing with hidden and very sensitive
issues such as bribes. When seeking such data, the ﬁrst author repeatedly
explained to the research participants about the type of questions he was
going to ask, promised to maintain conﬁdentially and to protect their
privacy, and assured the participants that the data were being collected
for academic purposes. The data were not shared with any third party.
With the help of local research assistants, the ﬁrst author ﬁrst iden-
tiﬁed and contacted hiboux in Uvira, Misisi and Kalemie. Prior to
iTSCi, these people had traded coltan in northern Katanga and
were based in these cities, located roughly – km from the
coltan mines. These hiboux were then asked whether they still had
activities or ‘contact persons’ (antennes) in the mining areas and if
they could refer the ﬁrst author to them. After explaining the research
objectives, regularly meeting with these hiboux and probably aided by
the fact that many of these hiboux were from South Kivu, the ﬁrst
author’s native province, he progressively gained their consent and
trust to gather information on their activities, and they began to
provide crucial data in a forthright manner. Of  hiboux initially
met in Uvira and Misisi,  agreed to provide information on their
antennes among which  were based in the coltan mines and  in
Kalemie. Once there, the ﬁrst author searched for these people and
conducted multiple interviews with them. He then cross-checked the
data by comparing them with those from the initial hiboux based in
Uvira and Misisi.
Other interviewees included  iTSCi ﬁeld staff in Nyunzu and
Kalemie,  civil servants in the division des mines (mining service) and
 of intelligence agencies, such as the National Intelligence Agency
(Agence Nationale des Renseignements, ANR) and Détection d’Activités
Militaires Anti-Patrie (DEMIAP); inspectors of investigation in the division
des mines/Kalemie and the mining police (Police des Mines et
Hydraucarbures, PMH) were also interviewed. Many civil servants, who
were appointed in mining areas to perform the iTSCi ‘tagging and
bagging’, worked along hiboux’ trading routes or in urban areas
hosting coltan black markets.
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 . L O C A L C O N T E X T O F  T M I N I N G A N D T H E C O L T A N T R A D E
In northern Katanga,  T mining – especially tin – began in . Until
, Géomines was the sole industrial company established in the
Manono territory (central part of Katanga). After the Belgian Congo
(now the DRC) gained independence in , Congo-Etain (renamed
Zaire-Etain in ) replaced Géomines until , when it ceased
operations (De Koning ). In , several deposits of coltan were
also discovered in the Manono, Kalemie and Nyunzu territories. In
December , the Kalemie ofﬁce of division des mines estimated that
there were a total of almost , artisanal miners working in Nyunzu
and Kalemie (Boniface Kyungu  Int.). Among these miners,
around , extracted coltan in eight mining sites (iTSCi-Katanga
mining list; iTSCi ).
Before iTSCi, the coltan trade was predominantly informal and
opaque in the study areas. Many coltan négociants originated from
North Kivu and South Kivu. They were ‘big men’. Connected to regional
buying houses (so-called comptoirs), many among these négociants of
Bashi and Nande ethnic groups gained their wealth from trading
coltan from the study areas to North and South-Kivu. Through various
intermediaries, these négociants transported the mineral by air, roads
or boats to the cities of Bukavu and Uvira (South-Kivu) and Goma
(North-Kivu). Their activities were closely interwoven with a web of
cartels and traders, who engaged in smuggling, an activity that has
deep historical roots in the DRC (MacGaffey ), including in nor-
thern Katanga and South-Kivu (Spittaels : ).
 . S I G N I F I C A N C E O F C O L T A N S M U G G L I N G
This section explains the importance of coltan smuggling in the three
mining areas. Hilson and Potter (: ) have pointed out that
illegal mineral sales are most rampant in contexts where governmental
control of the mineral sector tends to be excessive. The smuggling prac-
tices described further (Section ) provide evidence of this.
Although iTSCi contributed signiﬁcantly to tracing the ﬂow of coltan
(Section .), cases involving smuggling were found. Some of these
cases – for instance the theft on  August  of , kg of coltan
at the Kalemie-based depot of Minserve (a trading house) – occurred
outside of mining areas, making it difﬁcult for iTSCi to address them.
Additional cases involving smuggling were also reported, for instance
the vrages (or fausses matières) mixed by miners and négociants with
R E G U L A T I N G T H E O L D G A M E O F S M U G G L I N G ?
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genuine coltan (see Section .). Although it is difﬁcult to estimate the
total amount of vrages in circulation, in December , the Kisengo
police station intercepted ∼ kg of vrage brought into Kisengo at
checkpoints. From January to December , the Kisengo police also
intercepted . kg of smuggled coltan. According to one iTSCi ﬁeld
staff member, ﬁve cases of smuggling were reported in Kahendwa
from February to September  (iTSCi staff member a  Int.).
Meanwhile, many sources mentioned that ∼, kg of smuggled
coltan reached Uvira via Misisi that year (Civil servants b  and
 Int.; Hiboux b  Int.). In , the provincial ofﬁce of the
National Commission against Mineral Contraband (Commission
Nationale de Lutte contre la Fraude Minière) reported that  tonnes of
smuggled tin, tungsten and coltan were intercepted in Bukavu in 
(Radio Okapi ). Although one cannot conclude that all of this
coltan originated from the northern Katangese region, given the histor-
ical coltan production in North and South Kivu (De Failly ), scruti-
nising their tantalum concentration ledmany civil servants in themining
service in Uvira to believe that most of it did originate from northern
Katanga (Civil servants b  Int.).
 . P O L I C I N G S M U G G L I N G A N D T H E C O L T A N T R A D E
.. iTSCi in a regional smuggling framework
Although it was designed by the mining industry, iTSCi is part of a
regional governmental framework aimed at curbing contraband miner-
als in the African Great Lakes Region. This framework aligns with the
conﬂict-free mineral policy narrative, following the idea that
Congolese minerals ﬁnance violent conﬂicts (Autesserre ). To
improve the security situation in eastern DRC and to contribute to
state-building, improved transparency in trading  T (and gold) is
expected to cut the assumed ties between mining, violent conﬂicts and
the involvement of warmongers in the mining business.
In pursuit of this aim of greater security, efforts to address mineral
smuggling have been implemented at the regional and domestic
levels. This ﬁrst took shape in Lusaka, Zambia on  December ,
when  presidents of member states of the International Conference
of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) signed the Lusaka Declaration of
their Special Summit to Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
in the Great Lakes Region. In November , the ICGLR created a
regional anti-fraud committee. A ﬁrst meeting of this committee was
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held in Kinshasa on – April , gathering ICGLR’s state agencies
in charge of dealing with fraud and mineral contraband across the
member countries. Additionally, on  October , the DRC’s gov-
ernment created a national commission against mineral contraband
(decrees no. /CAB.MIN/MINES// and no. /CAB.
MIN/INT.SEC/) and iTSCi has also been expanded to neighbour-
ing countries, namely Rwanda (June ) and Burundi (May ).
.. Anti-smuggling provincial measures
In Katanga and South Kivu, addressing smuggling has been an ofﬁcial
priority of the provincial governments since the end of . In
October , the governor of Katanga, Moise Katumbi Chapwe,
raised administrative charges to US$ per kg on the transit of cassiterite
and its by-products, including coltan, from the Katanga province to any
other province. This measure aimed to discourage the sales of Katangese
minerals to other provinces, such as South-Kivu. Similarly, on  August
, Marcellin Chishambo, the governor of South Kivu, raised the frais
rémunératoires, a tax paid by licensed négociants, from US$. per kg to
US$ per kg of coltan and from US$. to US$. per kg of tin
(decree no. //GP/SK). Although it was also intended to
control contraband minerals, the main purpose of this measure was to
increase provincial tax revenues from mining.
The above measures, combined with a ban on mining activities in
North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema from September  to March
 (Geenen ) and the prominent role of the Katangese policy
network in establishing the iTSCi (Diemel & Cuvelier : ), led
iTSCi to expand to Katanga in  and has been the most concrete ini-
tiative implemented in  T mines. By the end of , iTSCi was being
put into action in  mining sites in eastern DRC, including 
located in Katanga. As a result, iTSCi has made a huge contribution to
improving the  T trade by making it more transparent. Before iTSCi,
Spittaels (: ) notes that ‘the comparison of data [between nor-
thern Katanga and South-Kivu] suggests large-scale smuggling.
Statistics from the Mining Division in Kalemie show  tonnes of
coltan shipped from Tanganyika to the Kivus in the ﬁrst three months
of ’. Yet, from  to , ,. tonnes of coltan (mainly
extracted in the three study sites) and ,. tonnes of tin were
exported from Katanga (Diemel & Cuvelier : ). According to
the  report from the division des mines, Kisengo alone produced
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 tonnes, ofﬁcially exported from Kalemie by Mining Mineral
Resources (MMR), a trading house that had been established by an
Indian business in .
.. Trading coltan under iTSCi
By  April , iTSCi had transformed the coltan mining areas of
Nyunzu and Kalemie from free spaces where négociants purchased
coltan independently into ‘enclaves of regulations’. These refer speciﬁ-
cally to closed spaces (the mining areas) where iTSCi ‘procedures and
organisational structures’ (Olivier de Sardan : ) of the coltan
market are applied. Practically, iTSCi worked closely with trading
houses (such as MMR) and mining cooperatives (Wakenge & Hilhorst
), which provided ﬁnancial and technical support to miners and
négociants (Figure ). Although these trading houses and cooperatives
had entitlements over  T mines (i.e. mining titles or trading licences),
they could only purchase coltan under iTSCi regulations. For instance,
iTSCi ﬁeld staff divided each mining area into sectors, subsectors and
sites composed of several tunnels (chantiers), allowing them to establish
selling points (postes d’achat) within each site. No minerals from another
site could enter into a site or be traded there. iTSCi ﬁeld staff monitored,
on a daily or weekly basis, the sale of coltan under iTSCi’s ‘tagging and
bagging’ system. In the mines, the iTSCi system consists of putting tags
on bags with minerals and data recording on iTSCi log books. iTSCi
staff also helped civil servants in the division des mines to record
mineral statistics. The cooperatives’ staff collected mineral loads and
proceeded to the ‘remise’, an operation consisting of handing over the
mineral loads to the trading houses’ counting ofﬁce where the minerals
were processed and bagged again, before being exported to the inter-
national market. All of these measures were meant to break up the exist-
ing networks of the informal coltan trade.
iTSCi has faced criticism. From its inception, it has been an externally
driven intervention led by ITRI. Moreover, according to some observers,
iTSCi has not totally eradicated informal mineral trafﬁcking and failed
to address problems associated with illegal taxation in which elements
of the Congolese army were involved (Global Witness ). Other
studies point out that iTSCi has been a technical solution to complex
problems of the mineral sector. IPIS (: ) for instance, argues
that, not only has iTSCi disrupted local livelihoods, but it did little to
improve social and environmental standards and, in a certain way, has
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even become a source of discrimination between powerful and less
powerful economic actors sourcing minerals under the mantel of the
‘tagging and bagging’ system.
.. Addressing smuggling under iTSCi
By , iTSCi had made signiﬁcant strides towards addressing smug-
gling. First, iTSCi ﬁeld staff monitored the ‘tagging and bagging’ of
coltan. They also completed ‘incident reports’ related to four categories
of practices: (i) cases of smuggling and issues related to ‘tagging and
bagging’, for instance mistakes in data recording; the loss, damage
and disappearance of tags; or recording higher than accurate weights
for parcels of coltan; (ii) acts of corruption; (iii) acts of harassment,
such as illegal taxes; and (iv) acts of insecurity and human rights
abuses committed against miners, négociants or other people by any
entity in a position of authority.
‘Incidents’ involving smuggling were repeatedly reported. However,
these reports were ‘conﬁdential’ and kept secret. In the eyes of iTSCi
ﬁeld staff members, this secrecy prevented them from confronting
people who were directly or indirectly involved or suspected to have
Figure . iTSCi’s role in the coltan supply chain. Source: Primary data
collected in –.
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caused these ‘incidents’. In , the Nyunzu-based iTSCi ﬁeld coordin-
ation ofﬁce completed approximately  incident reports monthly, of
which – concerned smuggling. In , there were only four
reports on smuggling. This indicates an important trend towards a
reduction in smuggling coltan.
Reporting and addressing ‘incidents’, including those involving smug-
gling, followed three steps. Reports were ﬁrst sent to iTSCi senior staff
members in Kalemie or Lubumbashi. Then, these senior staff
members contacted and eventually called in state ofﬁcials or senior
staff members of the mining cooperatives and trading houses, asking
them to address those ‘incidents’ in which their staff members were
allegedly involved in cooperating with hiboux, dishonest mineworkers
or mine-based négociants. The senior staff could then suspend them,
warn them or terminate their employment.
Smuggling was also addressed during meetings of the follow-up com-
mittees (Comité Local de Suivi, CLS), which were created at the instigation
of iTSCi. Gathering staff members from iTSCi, the trading houses and
cooperatives, together with miners’ representatives, négociants and
state ofﬁcials, the CLS were held monthly in either Nyunzu or
Kalemie. However, CLS meetings were often delayed for ﬁnancial
reasons or because many participants were unavailable. iTSCi staff
reported that:
During the meetings, people or entities incriminated in smuggling coltan
were often absent. Those who participated in these meetings felt offended
when cases of smuggling involving their staff were publicly discussed. In
many instances, although people participated in these meetings, their
agenda was sabotaged. (iTSCi staff members b  Int.)
Addressing smuggling also aligned with legal requirements. According
to Congolese mining law (Art. –), smugglers are to be arrested,
the smuggled and intercepted minerals are to be sold, and the
amount earned is to be deposited into a national treasury bank
account. In Nyunzu and Kalemie, no cases were documented in which
the smugglers were arrested (iTSCi Field coordinator  int.).
Rather, public prosecutors’ departments seized parcels of coltan and
sold them to trading houses, which ‘tagged and bagged’ them according
to the iTSCi system. However, the proﬁts from these sales were
embezzled by the representatives of the public prosecutors’ departments
(Civil servants c  Int.).
Overall, iTSCi has clearly been an important mechanism to counter-
act smuggling. However, in the view of some miners and mine-based
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négociants, iTSCi ﬁeld staff members’ work had an accusative character.
Négociants working for the Cooperative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo
(CDMC) stated:
In reporting and denouncing smuggling of coltan or any other illegal prac-
tice regarding the coltan’s trade, iTSCi ﬁeld staff members are so fast to
accuse us. Thus, if we inform them about everything we do for instance
regarding our sales of minerals to hiboux, their reports threaten to cause
us to be ﬁred from CDMC, making us jobless. (Négociants b  Int.)
Hence, iTSCi was not perceived in a positive way, especially in terms of
addressing smuggling. The sentiment expressed by the négociants above
also reveals fears about the consequences of total transparency in fully
embracing the iTSCi system. This also conﬁrms that (international)
policy, as well as humanitarian and development interventions, can gen-
erate unintended outcomes. Their rules, norms and principles are re-
interpreted through interactions among various social actors (Dijkzeul
& Wakenge ).
 . S M U G G L I N G C O L T A N : P R A C T I C E S , A C T O R S A N D M O T I V E S
Utas (: ) has argued that, given their clandestine and unstable
character, networks of conﬂict economies become ﬂexible, adopting
new functions. The present examination of the use of fake minerals
and the smuggling of coltan is highly relevant, because these were also
the most reported practices in other  T mining areas in northern
Katanga. Following Utas, we pay special attention to explaining how
these practices, as well as the actors and networks involved, adapted to
iTSCi regulations.
.. Vragage
Examining the practice known as vragage, it becomes clear that the belief
that the coltan business can be perfectly ‘cleaned’ is inaccurate.
Etymologically, vragage comes from vrac, a French term meaning some-
thing left in a jumble. Similarly, miners and négociants used the term
vrages to refer to fake minerals, worthless stones (sometimes called
fausses matières or faibles matières), and the by-products of coltan or
similar minerals, such as tin, which were often used for cheating or
smuggling.
Basically, the vrages were found only in certain places. They entered
into the coltan mining areas through two main sources. First, the
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hiboux transported vrages from often remote  T mines in northern
Katanga, mostly those where iTSCi was not yet implemented or had
been suspended, making it difﬁcult for cooperatives to operate. In
reality, iTSCi was not implemented in all areas, because certain mines
faced a depletion of minerals, were less productive or the coltan pro-
duced there had a low concentration of tantalum (e.g. Kilunga). In col-
laboration with drivers or local motorbike transporters, the hiboux
concealed parcels of vrages on trucks, in the reservoirs of motorbikes,
in oil drums, and in sacks of charcoal and maize that were brought
into coltan mining areas.
Second, vrages came from themaman muturuse, a group of women who
processed coltan before it was sold by mineworkers at the selling points.
After heating the coltan, the maman muturuse separated the genuine
coltan from the by-products. The latter were rarely thrown away,
leading people to believe that mineworkers and négociants used them
afterwards as vrages.
Selling vrages was cleverly organised. This process took place in private
houses or in the bush rather than at iTSCi selling points. Many hiboux
had local clients – predominantly miners or mine-based négociants.
They were not chosen by happenstance. During many informal conver-
sations with the hiboux, they noted that their clients were not only linked
through economic relationships (Hiboux a  Int.). Rather, their ties
were, in one way or another, kinship and/or trust-based (Hart ).
These clients fulﬁlled various tasks and used the vrages for diverse
ends. They were able to inform the hiboux about the evolution of
mining activities, the current coltan prices and the local security situ-
ation – for instance, the places where the mining police had erected
checkpoints. Clients purchased vrages themselves and also helped the
hiboux to sell them to other mineworkers or to mine-based négociants.
In the second half of , one kg of vrage cost around US$ in
Kisengo and Kahendwa, approximately half the price of genuine
coltan set by CDMC and the Cooperative Minière Maendeleo, which was
US$ in Kisengo and US$. in Kahendwa.
Vrages were also used for mineral-producing ends and coltan trade.
Mineworkers introduced vrages into their chantiers during the production
phase. They mixed these vrages with the mineral sand found there to
inﬂate the site’s productive potential. Mineworkers also mixed vrages
with the coltan sold to négociants. In addition, sous-couverts (lower-level
mineral buyers often appointed by négociants at selling points mostly on
the basis of trust relationships) used vrages to augment the quantity of
minerals purchased and introduced these vrages in the purchases of
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négociants. This implies that négociants also used vrages before they handed
over their parcels of minerals to the cooperatives (and these to trading
houses) who were thus losing out. Even though the vragage was prohibited
by iTSCi, none of the informants in this study denounced it.
Three explanations account for why vragage took place. First, this prac-
tice stemmed from the local organisation of the coltan market, which pro-
vided strong incentives for cheating and price evasion because of the
monopoly of certain actors like MMR, who set prices of coltan that were
continuously contested by mineworkers and négociants (Wakenge &
Hilhorst ). Also, given the limited production of coltan, the largest
coltan trading house and cooperative –MMR and CDMC – did not pur-
chase tin in Nyunzu and Kalemie; consequently, tin was mostly used as
a vrage in these territories. Additionally, iTSCi was the only reform initia-
tive implemented in the areas, and mining activity continued in those
areas where iTSCi did not expand or was halted, as it was in Kilunga.
However, mineworkers in these areas had no one to sell to unless their
mineral or their vrages were purchased by hiboux who were capable of mar-
keting them elsewhere, for instance in the Kahendwa or Kisengo mines.
Second, cheating and the smuggling of vrages resulted from the man-
agement policies of most trading houses and cooperatives. As men-
tioned above, there were signiﬁcant variations in the prices set for
coltan between and within the mining areas, depending on the concen-
tration of tantalum. For instance, in late , the price variation
between Kisengo and Kahendwa approached %, pushing many mine-
workers, local négociants and hiboux to search for promising market
opportunities in Kisengo.
The third explanatory factor for the use of vrages is their role as a
source of income. Négociants reported:
When we mixed  kg of genuine coltan with . kg of tin or other fausses
matières, we sold this mixture to the CDMC’s négociants. This operation
took place at any time after purchasing coltan from miners and our
income from this deal raised from US$. to an average of US
$. per  kg. (Négociants a ,  Int.)
All three reasons for vragage indicate that people have room to man-
oeuvre with cheating or smuggling coltan.
.. Hiboux
The relatively uncontrolled nature of the coltan trade can also be seen
when looking at the smuggling activities of the hiboux. These clandestine
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négociants either operated through local antennes or moved to coltan
mining areas from other mining areas, urban cities or other provinces
(e.g. from South Kivu to northern Katanga). Of the  hiboux followed
in the present study,  operated through antennes who were their close
relatives. The other antennes were people with whom the hiboux had col-
laborated for years. Both groups built up their relationships gradually
(Geenen : –). Given the hiboux’s mobility, dispersed through-
out the study area and using local connections, it was difﬁcult to estimate
how many hiboux there were, or how and when they formed their net-
works. Utas (: ) has argued that networks of conﬂict economies
are important to analyse but hard to pin down with precision. At the end
of , the Kisengo police station estimated that around  hiboux were
smuggling coltan in Kisengo alone (PMH chief and ANR staff members
 Int.).
Although the trading houses, cooperatives, state agencies and mining
police treated hiboux as illegal mineral buyers, the hiboux regularly visited
coltan mines and their adjoining villages. Mine-based négociants of
Kisengo and Mai-Baridi who worked for CDMC made the following
comment: ‘When we see some faces of people known as hiboux
coming to the mines, we guess that coltan prices have increased some-
where’ (Négociants a  Int.). In addition, four hiboux noted:
We often visited Kisengo and Kahendwa, where trading houses, coopera-
tives and iTSCi were unable to adjust coltan prices like in the cities. Once
there, we would hide to avoid being seen by their staff, but we knew
people to talk to in order to buy coltan. (Hiboux c  Int.)
Together, the above statements suggest two interesting elements. First,
coltan mining areas were not virgin territory for many hiboux; rather,
locally based négociants, their antennes and hiboux know each other
well. They not only had economic exchanges but were also embedded
in ‘networks of social relations’ (Granovetter : ). Such social
relations between traders have been documented earlier in the DRC.
In their study on trade networks between Congo and Paris, MacGaffey
& Bazenguissa-Ganga (: ) showed that networks are more than
conduits for economic transactions and emerge when people have
long-term and recurrent relations.
Both in and out of the mines, the hiboux were involved in two types of
activities. As discussed in the previous section, they ﬁrst marketed vrages.
They also smuggled coltan. This was ‘untagged’ and escaped iTSCi reg-
ulations. During their purchases, the hiboux offered higher prices than
the trading houses and cooperatives as a means of attracting clients.
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For instance, in October , when the price of coltan was US$. per
kg in Kisengo, hiboux offered to purchase it for US$. per kg (Miners a
 Int.). This variation ledmineworkers to wonder ‘why do hiboux never
experience bankruptcy?’ (Miners a  Int.). This question implies that,
although they cooperated with them, many mineworkers also believed
that the hiboux were better off and that these hiboux reaped higher
beneﬁts from smuggling than the income the mineworkers earned.
Coltan smugglingalsoﬂourishedbecauseof variationsbetweenprices set
inmining areas and those found in the blackmarkets of northern Katanga
and South Kivu. In February , one kg of coltan cost US$. in
Bukavu, US$ in Uvira and US$ in Kalemie. Each of these prices
exceeded that set in the mines, which ranged from US$. to  in
Kisengo and Mai-Baridi. Price variations contribute to ﬂourishing black
markets, feed ‘broader patterns relating to cross-border smuggling’ (IPIS
: ) and sustain shadowy commercial networks characteristic of the
Great Lakes Region economy (Vlassenroot & Perrot ). In Uvira,
many hiboux said on several occasions that they travelled to Bujumbura
for ‘business’ (Hiboux c  Int.), implying that they also tradedminerals,
especially coltan at higher prices than innorthernKatanga and SouthKivu.
The hiboux used various means to transport smuggled coltan out of the
mining areas. According to inspectors at the division des mines in Kalemie
and civil servants at ANR in Misisi and Uvira (Civil servants a  Int.),
hiboux used either commercial trucks or motorbikes and transported
their parcels mostly by road to Kalemie or via Misisi to Uvira or Bukavu.
Some parcels were transported to Uvira by boat from Kalemie.
Regardless of the itinerary, the parcels were sometimes divided into
small packages and then transported at various intervals (see Figure ).
Finally, the hiboux negotiated their passage with civil servants in the
areas where they travelled. When asked whether they feared being
arrested, several hiboux interviewed in Uvira remarked:
Tunajua kuongea na batu [‘We know how to talk to people]’. In the areas
where we travel, we often buy off some civil servants and obtain ofﬁcial
but often fake documents from them. These documents allow us to trans-
port coltan under the name of tin to evade certain taxes and to conceal
its value and origin.
Clearly, the hiboux were experienced in negotiating with the civil servants
appointed to curb the trade of contraband coltan. Similarly, in their
study on taxation at a border crossing between South Sudan and
Northern Uganda, Twijnstra et al. () found that norms and rules
were constantly re-negotiated between traders and local state ofﬁcials.
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.. Cheating in dealings with the hiboux
Cheating and smuggling practices were not only used to breach iTSCi
regulations. They were also used against the hiboux themselves. In
coltan mines, many hiboux operated within a web of actors. They had
antennes to recruit other mineworkers and mine-based négociants or
sous-couverts to purchase vrages or to allow them to smuggle coltan.
These actors and their social networks formed what can be seen as
close social cartels based predominantly on either kinship, friendship
or other trust-based relations that allowed them to develop and maintain
their economic transactions. Locally, there were therefore many differ-
ent cartels. This may explain why condemnation of misconduct
related to vragage or smuggling coltan rarely occurred in the study area.
Nevertheless, as Rubbers () argues about trust relations, social
proximity among Katangese traders does not exclude suspicion, nor
does social distance between them necessarily prevent trust.
In fact, smuggling was a two-way street. Within the cartels, miners
and mine-based négociants also duped the hiboux. Instead of selling
them genuine coltan, they also sold them vrages or other kinds of
Figure . Smugglers’ routes. Source: Adapted from De Koning (: ).
- - - - - Vrages’ routes; Coltan smuggling routes.
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fausses matières. In the eyes of the miners and the local négociants, many
hiboux were well off. They were convinced that the hiboux had the
opportunity to sell smuggled coltan at better prices, were richer
than they were and were exploiting them. Miners and local
négociants viewed hiboux as ‘big men’ and often said that the Hiboux,
na Muhindi (Indian in the Kiswahili language), bote ni bamwizi tu
[meaning that hiboux and expatriate staff of MMR, predominantly
from India, who were working for the company, were all stealing
from them] (Miners b  and  Int.). This wording suggests
that, although their objectives were not the same, mineworkers and
négociants often viewed hiboux and MMR staff as similar groups. At
the same time, although social networks were useful, relationships
between mineworkers, négociants and hiboux were of subtle ‘conniving
trust’. Although they could cooperate with the hiboux, miners and
négociants were also able to deceive them. Cheating against the
hiboux was not perceived as bad behaviour. Instead, the miners and
négociants viewed this as an act of resistance against a group of
hiboux who exerted control over the coltan black market and were
probably exploiting them. This is further illustrated in the following
account.
In Kalemie and Uvira, the ﬁrst author met, on several occasions, four
hiboux to whom mineworkers and mine-based négociants had sold vrages
(fausses matières). These hiboux said that this happened regularly.
The ﬁrst author then asked them whether, despite being deceived in
this way, the hiboux planned to travel to the mines and were willing to
continue their ‘clandestine’ trade. The hiboux conﬁrmed their intention
to continue going to the mining areas and to maintain collaboration
with their antennes. Additionally, they stated that they knew the minewor-
kers and négociants who had deceived them and were convinced that
these persons would provide them with an in-kind reimbursement in
the form of genuine coltan. Later, interviewed hiboux explained that:
Unless the deceivers left the mining areas, our antennes were responsible for
convincing them to provide this reimbursement. However, and more
importantly, those deceivers agreed to provide this reimbursement only
after being convinced that we would purchase coltan at higher prices
than before during their next visit to the mines. (Hiboux d  Int.)
This statement shows that the social networks in which mineworkers and
mine-based négociants participated played a key role in this ‘economy of
cheating’ against the smugglers.
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 . D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N S
This article has elucidated the process of smuggling coltan in northern
Katanga, the roles of the key actors involved and the effects of iTSCi
measures that have been taken to stop these illegal practices. In the
coltan mines, iTSCi aimed to improve the transparency and oversight
of the coltan trade. In this way, it intended to address the smuggling
of coltan. As part of a regional conﬂict-free mineral policy, beyond
iTSCi, there was an assumption that its activities could contribute to
Congolese state- and peace-building in severing armed actors from
mineral-based ﬁnancing. This article does not provide evidence for
this assumption in explaining whether the hiboux as ‘big men’ or
other mining actors contributed to the (ongoing) conﬂicts or how
they were related to the armed actors. Yet, the potential of smuggling
activities to trigger more conﬂict requires further investigation.
Noting that people have different responses to policy, this article con-
sidered smuggling a primary case of responses circumventing iTSCi
policy. This article draws on a sociology of economic life approach,
which relies on the idea that economic action is embedded in social net-
works (Beckert : ; Hilhorst et al. ). By analysing the interac-
tions of artisanal miners, négociants and their social networks in coltan
mining areas and between the Congolese regions of northern Katanga
and South Kivu, this article concludes that disregarding this social
embeddedness explains why iTSCi faced challenges.
Our key ﬁndings show that iTSCi technically organised the sale of
coltan. It set out a number of regulations and involved ofﬁcial entities
(trading houses and cooperatives) in purchasing coltan at the mine
level. It also established ofﬁcial selling points (postes d’achat) where
coltan was marketed, ‘tagged and bagged’. All of these procedures
brought a great deal of clarity to an opaque situation where, prior to
iTSCi’s implementation, a plethora of informal actors intervened in
the coltan trade.
For iTSCi, addressing smuggling meant breaking up pre-existing
informal trade networks. However, our ﬁndings also indicate that
these networks were maintained by mineworkers and mine-based
négociants, who adapted to the iTSCi regulations. Although iTSCi
addressed smuggling through various mechanisms, including ‘tagging
and bagging’ minerals, follow-up committees and reporting ‘incidents’,
these procedures overlooked the actors and social networks in which the
mineworkers and négociants were embedded. This web of actors included
mineworkers, négociants, local traders, antennes of the hiboux, and sous-
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couverts and helped the hiboux to operate in mining areas. These net-
works were predominantly based on personal and trust relations,
which conﬁrms the importance of a socialised conception of human
action in economic transactions (Granovetter ).
The present study reveals that the use of social networks was beneﬁcial
for mineworkers and négociants. Given that coltan prices varied between
mining areas, the politics of price ﬁxing by trading houses and coopera-
tives differed and the fact that there were variations in coltan purchase
prices between northern Katanga and South Kivu provided strong eco-
nomic incentives for cheating and smuggling. Meanwhile, social net-
works of mineworkers and négociants served to maintain an opaque
circuit around coltan trafﬁcking, as the operations of vragage illustrated.
In fact, vragage was condoned by all the participants involved in it. This
attitude resembles what Olivier de Sardan (: ) has observed
about practical norms in Africa and beyond – i.e. that people involved
in practices like ‘illegal’ payments view these as ‘small cheats that are
part of the game’.
Thus, the operations of social networks explain why smuggling contin-
ued. Smuggling breached and hampered iTSCi regulations. Importantly,
this study has also shown that social networks served miners and mine-
based négociants seeking to cheat the hiboux. Cheating on smugglers is
often hidden and under-reported in many studies on smuggling.
Smuggling also undermines state effectiveness, as was illustrated by signiﬁ-
cant coltan smuggling and the involvement of civil servants in facilitating
the hiboux’ clandestine smuggling operations. In sum, iTSCi has led to an
increase in the production of coltan, but not to the elimination of smug-
gling or a much stronger state.
Utas () has described networks of conﬂict economies as being
powerful, shaped by instability and evolving in a clandestine way,
making them ﬂexible, adaptable and under the control of ‘big men’.
The ﬁndings of the present study indicate that these features cannot
be restricted to conﬂict settings alone. Rather, these ﬁndings suggest
that many of these characteristics can also be found in post-conﬂict
economies such as northern Katanga, where the networks formed
around hiboux, who are ‘big men’ given their ﬁnancial resources and
connections to urban-based blackmarkets, were very ﬂexible in adapting
their smuggling activities. However, ordinary miners, whomay be seen as
‘less powerful’ actors, were also involved in these activities. In her
seminal research on the gold trade in Kamituga (South Kivu), Geenen
(: ) described a similar cheating practice like vragage after
ﬁnding that the ‘commission agents’ of gold sellers generated additional
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proﬁts by buying quantities of gold to sell elsewhere or by using their
manual scales to cheat when weighing the gold.
Finally, the present study has put to the test the idea of ‘enclaves of
regulations’ as closed and isolated territories where rules regarding
coltan trade are applied. It shows that the mining areas where iTSCi
policy is implemented are interconnected to the wider region.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop both a contextualised and global
approach to conﬂict mineral policies such as iTSCi (Cuvelier et al.
: ), and pay more attention to the logics behind existing informal
networks (Van Bockstael & Vlassenroot ) of which miners and
négociants are a part. This would help to regulate the old habit of
coltan smuggling more effectively.
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